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Equality and Women's Rights

EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN.

859

By Elizabeth H. Wol-

gast. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 1980. Pp. 176. $12.50.

Equality is a strong value in the American political tradition. As
a result, Elizabeth Wolgast points out, it is not surprising that current
arguments for women's rights frequently rely on equality principles.
She asserts, however, that because principles of justice are not always consistent with complete equality of treatment, equality principles by themselves cannot furnish an adequate conceptual basis for
an appropriate program of women's rights. Justice requires that men
and women be treated alike with respect to some rights (such as the
right to vote), but it also requires that men and women be treated
differently with respect to other rights (such as the right to maternity
care benefits). 1 Thus, Wolgast contends, it is a mistake to focus exclusively on the ideal of equality in arguing for women's rights.
In her opening chapter, Wolgast considers the claim that the
right to equal treatment is based on similarity or sameness. She finds
that while this assertion succeeds for race, it fails for sex. In her
view, although the races are alike in all important respects, men and
women are not: that women bear children and men do not creates a
significant difference between the sexes. While a just society should
ignore differences in skin color, it should respectfully accept differences of sex. Wolgast argues that an "assimilationist" society - one
which seeks to ignore totally differences of sex - would be a kind of
Procrustean bed. It would require massive conditioning to make its
members think like androgynous creatures with identical sex roles.
Having found sameness unsatisfactory as a principle for developing just relations between men and women, Wolgast next examines
and rejects two other models of equality: equality of ordinary things
and equality of social peers. First, she explains that to say that two
things are unequal implies that they must differ in some feature that
is subject to comparison. In other words, some common measure is
required. When two things measure the same, they are equal, but a
judgment of equality presupposes the possibility that the two things
might have been unequal in the measured respect. When a measure
is lacking - as between, say, a rainbow and a Wordsworth ode then equality is a meaningless concept. Because our morality will
not acknowledge the possibility of a measure according to which
I. The author acknowledges that special rights which depend on the particular needs of
individuals might more properly be termed benefits or privileges rather than rights. She uses
the terminology of rights, however, because when people commonly speak of ''women's
rights," they mean to include benefits such as maternity leave.
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some humans are equal and others unequal, one cannot apply this
principle of equality to human beings. Indeed, Wolgast argues, the
real egalitarian thesis is precisely that human worth stands beyond
measure - an insight which the rhetoric of equality tends to obscure.
Wolgast similarly finds that the equality of social peers is an inappropriate model for just relations between the sexes. She defines
peers as independent individuals who share a common interest; she
gives as examples fellow travelers and comrades-at-arms. She contends that while men and women function as peers in some contexts,
peership does not accurately describe the relationship between husband and wife during the phase of marriage which involves childbearing and rearing.
Although her discussion of equality models seems far from exhaustive, Wolgast apparently concludes that any general equality
model will break down in some respect when applied to relations
between the sexes. This breakdown, she observes, is evident in attempts to use equality principles to settle legal disputes. In her review of recent Supreme Court cases on women's rights,2 she finds
that sometimes women's legal rights rest on women's similarity to
men: a law is unconstitutional, for example, if it prefers a male as
the administrator of an estate when a male and a female candidate
have comparable claims. In other cases, women's rights depend on
their differences from men: only women enjoy the right to have an
abortion since only women can bear children. In law as in philosophy, the author argues, some of the rights needed by women, especially those connected with jobs and promotions, are equal rights,
while others, particularly relating to women who care for a family,
are special rights.
Despite the impossiblity of developing a model for just relations
between men and women that is based entirely on equality principles
and ignores differences between men and women, Wolgast observes
that we persist in viewing humans as sexless. She offers two explanations for this inclination: first, our view of human nature as spiritual
and rational rather than merely animal or physical, and second, the
atomistic model of society which dominates social science, economics, and philosophy. These two conceptual traditions, she explains,
2. The book discusses the following cases: Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484 (1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); and
Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
950 (1971).
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create difficulties for the advance of women's rights. As an alternative to our view of human nature as androgynous, Wolgast advocates
a "bivalent" form of thinking that distinguishes between the interests
of men and women. She also believes that we should replace the
atomistic model of society with one that emphasizes human connections and interdependence:
Many important facts should be taken into account: that a baby needs
someone's time-consuming love and care; that elderly persons are unable to compete for their sustenance; that child-bearing and child-nurturing are not primarily ways to satisfy self-oriented desires; that
families are not associations of individuals who join together for their
mutual benefit. [Pp. 16-17.]

A model that cannot reasonably represent these facts, she says, is not
an acceptable model of human society.
Wolgast concludes that the concept of equality has become a
convenient but dangerous oversimplification in arguments for women's rights. The ideal of equality threatens to force women to identify their interests with those of men and to conform to a masculine
norm. As Wolgast herself admits, however, merely to recognize that
justice between men and women requires a combination of equal
and special rights does not solve the difficult task of specifying the
appropriate mixture. Equality and the Rights of Women does not attempt this task. The value of Wolgast's book lies in her eloquent
argument that we cannot begin to solve this problem until we discard
that "all-purpose" ideal of equality and replace it with a more sophisticated conception that recognizes the differences between men
and women.

